Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism

Zuber, Christina Isabel

Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism

Dateien

Zuber_0-369490.pdfGröße: 209.88 KBDownloads: 647

Datum

2011

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Comparative Political Studies. 2011, 44(5), pp. 546-571. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414010364350

Zusammenfassung

This article presents a baseline theory of asymmetrical federalism in multinational states. Two arguments building on a game-theoretic foundation link central and regional elites’ strategic choices to questions of federal stability. The first argument concerns the creation of asymmetrical institutions. In a confrontation game between the center and national minorities credibly threatening to exit the framework, the center’s decision to grant asymmetrical autonomy ensures mutual cooperation. Yet by extending the level of autonomy for minority regions, federal asymmetry creates a third player, the nonadvantaged regions. Consequently, the second argument models asymmetrical federalism as a “nested game” where events in the ethnonational arena determine the payoffs in the federal arena. Asymmetrical federal rules turn out to be inherently unstable from a perspective that takes all actors in all arenas into account. A narrative of the development of Russian federalism exemplifies the theory.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Schlagwörter

asymmetrical federalism, federal stability secession, multinational states, Russian federalism, nested games

Zitieren

ISO 690

ZUBER, Christina Isabel, 2011. Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism. In: Comparative Political Studies. 2011, 44(5), pp. 546-571. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414010364350

BibTex

@article{Zuber2011-05-01Under-36208,
  year={2011},
  doi={10.1177/0010414010364350},
  title={Understanding the Multinational Game : Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism},
  number={5},
  volume={44},
  issn={0010-4140},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={546--571},
  author={Zuber, Christina Isabel}
}

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