Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games

Fischbacher, Urs; Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska; Teyssier, Sabrina

Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games

Dateien

Fischbacher_0-389124.pdfGröße: 356.34 KBDownloads: 79

Datum

2011

Autor:innen

Fischbacher, Urs

Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska

Teyssier, Sabrina

Schriftenreihe

ALISS

URI (zitierfähiger Link)

http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-389124

Link zur Lizenz

Urheberrechtlich geschützt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

Contributions to public goods are often unobservable. In order to make contributions visible, voluntary standards are used, which make a particular contribution level publicly observable. This paper investigates the effect of such partial information on the contributions to public goods. First, we observe that the implementation of a too low standard level leads to the lowest efficiency. Second, we find that standards function as a coordination device. Higher standards give rise to higher modal contribution but the likelihood that the standard level is reached gets lower. Third, conditional cooperation is observed in the sense that subjects are more likely to comply with the standard as the number of group members who previously complied with it is higher.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Public goods, Information, Standards, Coordination

Zitieren

ISO 690

FISCHBACHER, Urs, Franziska FÖLLMI-HEUSI, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2011. Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games

BibTex

@techreport{Fischbacher2011Volun-38203,
  year={2011},
  series={ALISS},
  title={Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games},
  number={2011-03},
  author={Fischbacher, Urs and Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska and Teyssier, Sabrina}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja