Conceivability and the A Priori

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Kupffer_0-398699.pdf
Kupffer_0-398699.pdfGröße: 281.31 KBDownloads: 111
Datum
2003
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Forschungsberichte der DFG-Forschergruppe Logik in der Philosophie. 2003, 108
Zusammenfassung

David Chalmers claims that there is (i) a sense of “conceivable” in which conceivability directly implies metaphysical possibility and (ii) a sense in which it implies epistemic possibility. We have reason to doubt this thesis. First, the proposed ambiguity cannot account for some basic examples; even in the context of a natural reading of the famous zombie argument none of the two senses really seem to be appropriate. Second, a proper analysis of conceivability does not validate the claim that conceivability always implies some kind of possibility. “It is conceivable that S” is not ambiguous and merely implies that it is epistemically possible that S is not inconsistent. Finally I show how to square the weakness of these implications with the fact that thought experiments sometimes inform us of what we should rationally believe to be possible.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
100 Philosophie
Schlagwörter
Vorstellbarkeit, Conceivability, Modalität, Modality, Sprachphilosophie, Philosophy of Language, Philosophie des Geistes, Philosophy of Mind
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690KUPFFER, Manfred, 2003. Conceivability and the A Priori. In: Forschungsberichte der DFG-Forschergruppe Logik in der Philosophie. 2003, 108
BibTex
@article{Kupffer2003Conce-38317,
  year={2003},
  title={Conceivability and the A Priori},
  volume={108},
  journal={Forschungsberichte der DFG-Forschergruppe Logik in der Philosophie},
  author={Kupffer, Manfred}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/38317">
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/45"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">David Chalmers claims that there is (i) a sense of “conceivable” in which conceivability directly implies metaphysical possibility and (ii) a sense in which it implies epistemic possibility. We have reason to doubt this thesis. First, the proposed ambiguity cannot account for some basic examples; even in the context of a natural reading of the famous zombie argument none of the two senses really seem to be appropriate. Second, a proper analysis of conceivability does not validate the claim that conceivability always implies some kind of possibility. “It is conceivable that S” is not ambiguous and merely implies that it is epistemically possible that S is not inconsistent. Finally I show how to square the weakness of these implications with the fact that thought experiments sometimes inform us of what we should rationally believe to be possible.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:creator>Kupffer, Manfred</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/45"/>
    <dcterms:title>Conceivability and the A Priori</dcterms:title>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-04-04T14:07:09Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/38317/3/Kupffer_0-398699.pdf"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/38317"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2003</dcterms:issued>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/38317/3/Kupffer_0-398699.pdf"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/>
    <dc:contributor>Kupffer, Manfred</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-04-04T14:07:09Z</dcterms:available>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Nein
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen