Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim

Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

Dateien

fenglmaier.pdfGröße: 7.21 MBDownloads: 1140

Datum

2010

Autor:innen

Englmaier, Florian

Wambach, Achim

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Games and Economic Behavior. 2010, 69(2), pp. 312-328. ISSN 0899-8256. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007

Zusammenfassung

We analyze the classic moral hazard problem with the additional assumption that agents are inequity averse. The presence of inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. When the concern for equity becomes more important, there is convergence towards linear sharing rules. The sufficient statistics result is violated. Depending on the environment, contracts may be either overdetermined, i.e. include non-informative performance measures, or incomplete, i.e. neglect informative performance measures. Finally, our model delivers a simple rationale for team based incentives, implying wage compression.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Contract theory, linear contracts, incentives, sufficient statistics result, inequity aversion, incomplete contracts

Zitieren

ISO 690

ENGLMAIER, Florian, Achim WAMBACH, 2010. Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2010, 69(2), pp. 312-328. ISSN 0899-8256. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007

BibTex

@article{Englmaier2010Optim-12712,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007},
  title={Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion},
  number={2},
  volume={69},
  issn={0899-8256},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={312--328},
  author={Englmaier, Florian and Wambach, Achim}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/12712">
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We analyze the classic moral hazard problem with the additional assumption that agents are inequity averse. The presence of inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. When the concern for equity becomes more important, there is convergence towards linear sharing rules. The sufficient statistics result is violated. Depending on the environment, contracts may be either overdetermined, i.e. include non-informative performance measures, or incomplete, i.e. neglect informative performance measures. Finally, our model delivers a simple rationale for team based incentives, implying wage compression.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:contributor>Englmaier, Florian</dc:contributor>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:contributor>Wambach, Achim</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:title>Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-07-05T08:25:36Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2010), 2, pp. 312-328</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/12712/1/fenglmaier.pdf"/>
    <dc:creator>Englmaier, Florian</dc:creator>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-07-05T08:25:36Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/12712/1/fenglmaier.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2010</dcterms:issued>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/12712"/>
    <dc:creator>Wambach, Achim</dc:creator>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Universitätsbibliographie

Nein