Are national pension systems efficient if labor is (im)perfectly mobile?

Breyer, Friedrich; Kolmar, Martin

Are national pension systems efficient if labor is (im)perfectly mobile?

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Datum

2002

Autor:innen

Breyer, Friedrich

Kolmar, Martin

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

In this paper we analyze the effects of labor-market integration on national, unfunded public-pension systems that are organized according to a ‘place of residence’ principle. With this principle, labor might migrate for purely fiscal reasons. Thus, some kind of coordination becomes necessary. We first show that for the case of unrestricted labor mobility the equalization of contributions is necessary and sufficient for efficiency if the pension systems remain decentralized. However, national decision makers do not in general have an incentive to voluntarily stick to equalized contributions. With a segmented labor market where one segment is costlessly mobile whereas the other segment is completely immobile, the coordination requirements are far more complicated if migration cannot compensate for differences in national fertilities. If it can, the efficiency of equalization turns out to be robust. Finally we show that replacing the principle of residence with the ‘principle of nationality’ does not eliminate the risk of fiscal externalities.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

BREYER, Friedrich, Martin KOLMAR, 2002. Are national pension systems efficient if labor is (im)perfectly mobile?. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2002, 83(3), pp. 347-374. ISSN 0047-2727. Available under: doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00170-5

BibTex

@article{Breyer2002natio-16636,
  year={2002},
  doi={10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00170-5},
  title={Are national pension systems efficient if labor is (im)perfectly mobile?},
  number={3},
  volume={83},
  issn={0047-2727},
  journal={Journal of Public Economics},
  pages={347--374},
  author={Breyer, Friedrich and Kolmar, Martin}
}

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