Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Neustadt, Ilja

Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games

Dateien

12757.pdfGröße: 331 KBDownloads: 221

Datum

2010

Autor:innen

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos

Neustadt, Ilja

URI (zitierfähiger Link)

http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-127579

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1142/S021919891000260X

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

International Game Theory Review. 2010, 12(2), pp. 197-204. Available under: doi: 10.1142/S021919891000260X

Zusammenfassung

We consider a model of evolution with mutations as in Kandori et al. (1993) [Kandori, M., Mailath, G.J., Rob, R., 1993. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61, 29 56], where agents follow best-response decision rules as in Sandholm (1998) [Sandholm, W., 1998. Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution. Economics Letters 61, 165 170]. Contrary to those papers, our model gives rise to a birth-death process, which allows explicit computation of the long-run probabilities of equilibria for given values of the mutation rate and the population size. We use this fact to provide a direct proof of the stochastic stability of risk-dominant equilibria as the mutation rate tends to zero, and illustrate the outcomes of the dynamics for positive mutation rates.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Coordination games, learning, mutation, birth-death processes

Zitieren

ISO 690

ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Ilja NEUSTADT, 2010. Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games. In: International Game Theory Review. 2010, 12(2), pp. 197-204. Available under: doi: 10.1142/S021919891000260X

BibTex

@article{AlosFerrer2010Bestr-12173,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1142/S021919891000260X},
  title={Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games},
  number={2},
  volume={12},
  journal={International Game Theory Review},
  pages={197--204},
  author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Neustadt, Ilja}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja