Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior

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2006
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Schjelderup, Guttorm
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Zusammenfassung

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Corporate tax systems, tacit collusion
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ISO 690SCHINDLER, Dirk, Guttorm SCHJELDERUP, 2006. Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior
BibTex
@techreport{Schindler2006Compa-12180,
  year={2006},
  series={CoFE-Diskussionspapiere / Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie},
  title={Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior},
  number={2006/01},
  author={Schindler, Dirk and Schjelderup, Guttorm}
}
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