Government Status and Legislative Behaviour : Partisan Veto Players in Australia, Denmark, Finland and Germany
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In parliamentary systems, parties compete for votes and offices in the electoral arena, but in many systems they also cooperate in the legislative arena. This article examines the question of how the government status of parties affects their legislative behaviour. We develop a simple spatial model that includes parties positional goals (vote, office, etc.) to formalize the notion of accommodating legislative behaviour. The model implies that government parties are most accommodating while opposition parties are least accommodating. The hypothesis is evaluated by comparing two pairs of similar political systems: Danish and Finnish coalition governments, as well as German and Australian bicameralism. The case studies support the main hypothesis that government status systematically affects parties level of accommodation. We discuss the implications for two seminal approaches in comparative institutional analysis advanced by Lijphart (1999b) and Tsebelis (2002).
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GANGHOF, Steffen, Thomas BRÄUNINGER, 2006. Government Status and Legislative Behaviour : Partisan Veto Players in Australia, Denmark, Finland and Germany. In: Party Politics. 2006, 12(4), pp. 521-539. Available under: doi: 10.1177/1354068806064732BibTex
@article{Ganghof2006Gover-4003, year={2006}, doi={10.1177/1354068806064732}, title={Government Status and Legislative Behaviour : Partisan Veto Players in Australia, Denmark, Finland and Germany}, number={4}, volume={12}, journal={Party Politics}, pages={521--539}, author={Ganghof, Steffen and Bräuninger, Thomas} }
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