Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage

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2008
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Madden, Paul
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Labour Economics. 2008, 15(3), pp. 334-349. ISSN 0927-5371. eISSN 1879-1034. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.06.011
Zusammenfassung

We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Holdup, Investment, Minimum wage
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ISO 690KAAS, Leo, Paul MADDEN, 2008. Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage. In: Labour Economics. 2008, 15(3), pp. 334-349. ISSN 0927-5371. eISSN 1879-1034. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.06.011
BibTex
@article{Kaas2008Holdu-11992,
  year={2008},
  doi={10.1016/j.labeco.2007.06.011},
  title={Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage},
  number={3},
  volume={15},
  issn={0927-5371},
  journal={Labour Economics},
  pages={334--349},
  author={Kaas, Leo and Madden, Paul}
}
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